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BOOK REVIEWS
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
THE SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-1861. By Kermit L. Hall. Lincoln,
Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1979. Pp. xvii, 268. $19.50
Reviewed by Lawrence M. Friedman*
In The Politics of Justice, Kermit L. Hall, a history professor
at Wayne State University, takes a look at the way Presidents from
Jackson through Buchanan picked judges for the federal district
courts and for the territories. There were 240 such appointments
during the period studied.
Each of the eight Presidents had his own style of proceeding,
and each was swayed by different factors. At all times Presidents
were keenly, painfully aware of the country's troubles and their
own, politically speaking, and tried to appoint men who would help
out one or the other, or both. Van Buren, for example, tried to
"place on the federal courts of the South candidates with a firm
attachment to the Union."' Polk looked for original Democrats and
strict constructionists.2 Some Presidents were in vigorous control of
the process (Polk carefully sifted potential candidates himself);
others drifted or let others take the lead. Zachary Taylor (not one
of the great Presidents, to put it mildly) let his Secretary of State,
John Clayton, dictate selection of judges, along with the Senators
from the Whig party.' The constant, nagging, never-ending ques-
tion of slavery complicated appointments, particularly such sensi-
tive ones as those in the Kansas Territory. When Utah was organ-
ized as a territory, the Mormon question poisoned and confused the
process. Hall takes up each administration in somewhat bewilder-
ing detail. It seems as if each case is different, each comes out of a
unique background, eaclh reflects a unique chemistry of fac-
tors-the President, his character, his party, where the district
was, who the candidates were, the state of the nation, and so on.
Clearly, it is difficult to dredge general conclusions out of silt so
complex and contradictory.
Still, Hall has a thesis. His book covers the period of the so-
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University. J.D., University of Chi-
cago, 1951; M.LL., University of Chicago, 1953; LL.D., University of Puget Sound School of
Law, 1977.
1. K. HALL, THE POLrrIcs OF JusTimE: LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE SEC-
oND PARTY SYSTEM, 1829-1861, at 36 (1979).
2. Id. at 62.
3. Id. at 86.
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called second party system; his thesis is that the judicial selection
process was in transition to "political modernization" during the
period.' It would be fairer to call this a hypothesis rather than a
thesis. He finds some support for the proposition, but he has to
admit that "vestiges" of traditional political order remained
throughout the period.'
The reader will naturally ask, since supposedly we are in tran-
sition to it, what we mean by "modern" political culture anyway.
Hall tells us right off: "In a modernizing political culture, critical
political activities become institutionalized-that is, the decision-
making process tends to become formal, impersonal, automatic and
bureaucratic-nominees for appointment to public office are usu-
ally selected on the basis of special training and experience."' Now,
if that is what we mean by political modernization, we do not have
to read much further to guess whether Hall will find it happening
or not. After all, we know a little bit about selection as it is today;
it is certainly not "formal, impersonal, automatic and bureau-
cratic." We have apparently not yet reached the modern stage.
Only those with very, very childlike faiths would believe that re-
cent Presidents have picked their judges chiefly because they were
outstanding in training and experience. In fact, it is hard to see
much difference between the process Hall describes and what goes
on today (at least judging from the newspapers). It is the same
witches' brew of politics, policy, and expediency. At the end of his
book, Hall tries to sum up what his study shows: "[I]n the selec-
tion of lower federal court judges, the political culture of the era
moved gradually, incrementally, unevenly, and incompletely to-
ward political modernity."7 This is, in a way, a rather odd state-
ment, since it is hard to see what exactly in his story supports it.
Moreover, at least by implication, he seens to be contrasting selec-
tion in his period with the way judges were chosen before Andrew
Jackson, and the way they were later chosen by Presidents
Lincoln, McKinley, Franklin Roosevelt, or Carter. But since he
gives us no data about this selection process before or after Jack-
son, we do not know what to make of the "movement" he thinks
he detects. There is some "movement," to be sure, within the
period but (to me at least) not very much, and not on the whole
the sort of process Hall is talking about.
I suspect that the concept of "modern" political culture is a
4. Id. at xv.
5. Id. at xvii.
6. Id. at xv.
7. Id. at 174.
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straw man, and that by dragging in the idea of bureaucratic selec-
tion Hall muddies the issues. These definitions of what is "mod-
ern," if they are valid at all, apply to the civil service, to the lower
order of bureaucrats. Presidents do not, and cannot, be "modern"
when they choose White House aides, running mates, Supreme
Court judges, and, yes, lower court judges. The hallmark of
"premodern" political behavior is selection based on patronage, on
ties of kinship or friendship. This behavior persisted (to no great
surprise) in the period studied. Many judges owed their jobs to
whom they knew, or married, or shared an ancestor with, rather
than to what they knew. President Tyler, for example, appointed
his own brother-in-law, John B. Christian, to a vacancy in the
Eastern District of Virginia. In this case, the Senate rejected the
nomination.8 Tyler was unpopular, and this nomination was con-
troversial on many grounds. "Traditional patronage practices
predicated on kinship"' did not usually fail; the "kinship" was
typically congressional, not presidential. Van Buren appointed
Isaac S. Pennybacker of Virginia on the urging of Congressman
Greene B. Samuels, his brother-in-law. Even in the cautious and
high-minded Polk administration, one-quarter of the nominees
had "family ties to principal mediators.""0 The appointment of
relatives is always a bit touchy, but we have plenty of recent ex-
amples. President Kennedy, after all, made his brother Attorney
General; a cousin of President Carter is on the White House staff.
The "premodern" selection process is still, I believe, very much
with us. Ties of kinship or friendship with senators, congressmen,
and other politicians are very important to any aspiring judge-not
that merit and training are irrelevant. It is hard for someone to win
nomination or to be confirmed if he is believed to be substandard.
The Senate rejected two of Nixon's choices for the Supreme Court,
Haynsworth and Carswell, on this ground (although it is questiona-
ble whether or not their belief was sincere)." Judges must be law-
yers, and the American Bar Association and other organized bodies
have been insisting, with more and more success, that nobody
should be appointed to high judicial office without measuring up to
the strictest standards. Trial experience is essential, and judicial
experience very much preferred. The screening process is becoming
8. Id. at 57.
9. Id. at 33.
10. Id. at 62.
11. See Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme Court
Nominees, 13 LAw & Soc'y Rv. 927 (1979) (arguing that what leads Senators to vote "no" is
dissatisfaction with the policy or ideology of nominees). But competence (or lack of it) pro-
vides a good excuse for a vote, if nothing else.
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more formal, more institutional. The organized bar plays a crucial
role,"2 which of course it did not in the nineteenth century (there
was no organized bar to speak of before 1870). Still, everyone
knows that the appointment of a judge is not at all like the ap-
pointment of a lower civil servant. Judges are almost always politi-
cal people. They are almost always appointed for some reason that
goes beyond the simple desire to have somebody good on the
bench. In this regard, very little has changed since Andrew Jack-
son's time.
These other motives for choosing a particular nominee are, of
course, very varied. Sometimes the President wants to make sure
his policies are carried out. Andrew Jackson, according to Hall,
wanted to "place his imprint upon the lower federal judiciary"; he
wanted judges "whose views paralleled his own," and he even con-
ducted personal interviews to make sure his men were right think-
ers. 3 As the country lurched and staggered toward the Civil War, a
succession of Presidents tried vainly to avoid North-South rupture.
Many issues were wrapped up in the slavery question, and federal
and territorial courts often had to deal with them. Presidents thus
tried to preserve some kind of balance by choosing the right kind of
judge-someone who would not inflame the issue or someone who
would tilt to one side or the other, when this seemed best or most
expedient. Buchanan's Attorney General, Jeremiah Sullivan Black,
wanted men who would uphold the "rule of law" and thus enforce
the Fugitive Slave Act, the neutrality laws, and the ban against
the slave trade." Hall's book is particularly useful in documenting
the selection process. He weaves a rich fabric of detail. No prior
book, I believe, has shown us so clearly the political process at
work in judicial selection and tied this process so tightly to the gen-
eral course of American history. Along the way, we see how the
focus of selection shifted from the President himself to the Secre-
tary of State and then to the Attorney General, and we learn a lot
about the rise of senatorial courtesy, a custom still with us today.
There is also the interesting story of the idea of rotation in
office and the case of the territorial judges. Ordinary federal judges
had life tenure; the Constitution gave it to them. But what about
territorial judges? This was a debatable question, and the law was
hardly clear on this point. Presidents from Jackson on felt they
could remove territorial judges. 5 But Millard Fillmore was the first
12. See, e.g., J. GRoSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1965).
13. K. HALL, supra note 1, at 26.
14. Id. at 133.
15. This was because of American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). This
case did not directly affect the removal power. It did hold, however, that territorial courts
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who actually fired a territorial judge. He almost had to. He was
beset with crises and scandals in Minnesota, Utah, New Mexico,
and Oregon. The controversy over Aaron Goodrich, Chief Justice of
the Minnesota Territory, was especially virulent. He was a drunken
adulterer, people said; far worse, he was a biased judge. Goodrich
had business connections with a certain fur company, and favored
his own interests in cases about trapping rights and land claims. At
least so his opponents said. Fillmore moved cautiously, but, ar-
mored with an opinion from his Attorney General, ultimately got
rid of Goodrich."6 Franklin Pierce was the first President to use his
power over territorial judges systematically, that is, to make as
clean a sweep as he could. He refused to renew expired commis-
sions and simply threw out the rest of the territorial judges. The
Senate sustained his actions. 7
All very good, and very informative. The conceptual appara-
tus, however, strikes me as somewhat strained. Hall wants to tie
senatorial courtesy and the "rotation" of territorial judges into his
scheme. He calls them "significant, if somewhat belated, moderniz-
ing developments" that "institutionalize ... the selection process
by integrating the needs of the executive and legislative wings of
the party and by regularizing the method of selection and re-
moval." 8 I fail to see what he means by all this. It is as if, having
determined that his book is about "modernization," he is bound
and determined to sniff it out everywhere, by hook or by crook.
Senatorial courtesy is neither modern nor nonmodern. If it means,
as logically it might, that senators, not the President, really choose
judges, then the question is: on what basis do senators choose? If
they choose on the basis of kinship or patronage, then we are as
premodern as we ever were. The same thing could be said about
rotation in office. The question is not whether judges "rotated,"
but who set them spinning, and why?
There is something of a literature on the selection process,"
although Hall's book does fill a rather glaring hole. The tale Hall
were not "constitutional courts" (which would tie them to life tenure) but "legislative
courts," created by "virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the govern-
ment," or by virtue of Congress' power over the territories. Id. at 546.
16. K. HALL, supra note 1, at 107. Goodrich fought back, in United States ex rel. Good-
rich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284 (1855). The President, he said, had no power to remove him and
he demanded his salary. The Supreme Court dodged the issue on technical grounds. Justice
McLean dissented, arguing that the court should have reached the merits, and that a Presi-
dent could not remove a territorial judge, appointed for a definite term, before that term
expired.
17. K. HA, supra note 1, at 115.
18. Id. at 129.
19. See, e.g., id. at xv.
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tells rings true if we ignore a few overripe conclusions. It is one of
the virtues of the book that he gives us the selection process un-
varnished. The Presidents and their men are not cynical, not
villainous; they are simply politicians. They are constantly balanc-
ing considerations of patronage and local political debts against no-
tions of policy. Most writers about selection today agree that poli-
tics plays an important, even an overwhelming role. On the other
hand, there is the plain, inescapable fact that federal judgeships
(putting territorial judges to one side) carry life tenure. There was
some brief flirtation with impeachment at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. As a way to clean out the bench, politically,
this idea was pretty much abandoned by the end of the Jefferson
administration, and a pattern was set which has remained more or
less to this day: impeachment is reserved for gross crime or corrup-
tion.2 Hence, even when Presidents fill vacancies in such a way as
to promote their policies, they have no control over the way judges
act in the future. This has been shown over and over again in the
history of the Supreme Court. The President is constantly betrayed
by the men he appoints. This probably began as early as Joseph
Story. In our day, Earl Warren was another egregious example. The
four men Nixon appointed bit the hand that fed them, too, by vot-
ing against him in United States v. Nixon, ' the famous case of the
Nixon tapes.
These facts do not mean that the selection process is not im-
portant to the President or to whoever does the selecting. But the
importance probably lies less in the judge's future influence on pol-
icy than on his past and on the meaning of the selection process
itself. The President, precisely because he has so little influence
over what judges will do in the future, is tempted to downplay this
future role, and use selection for other purposes-to reward cronies,
to kick upstairs cabinet and staff who have outlived their useful-
ness, to reward party faithful, to placate certain members of Con-
gress, in short, to solve current political or administrative
problems. This means that judgeships are (and were) handed out a
little bit like embassies, although not in quite so blatant a manner.
Tradition, the bar, and public opinion set certain real limits. Any-
body can be an ambassador, but only a certain kind of lawyer can
make a judge.
A question immediately presents itself. Practically speaking,
once a federal judge gets past the Senate, the judge can sit as long
as he or she wants. Judges are, therefore, immune to the winds of
20. See L. FRmDMAN, A HisTORy OF AMERICm LAW 113-16 (1978).
21. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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politics-to political weather, although certainly not to political
climate. Yet the process has always been intensely political. Is it
any more or less political than the process in the states? We have
to remember that, by the middle of the nineteenth century, state
judges (with some exceptions) were elected rather than appointed.
Did this difference in tenure evoke differences in the selection
process? The case of the territorial judges might suggest something
of an answer. After all, the President could, if he wished, remove
territorial judges. At least judging from Hall's material, the process
of picking these men seemed, in essence, much the same as the
process of picking other federal judges. There are no glaring differ-
ences; hence we cannot say that Presidents approached the task of
appointing judges for the territories less cautiously.
There were differences, however, in the two sets of judges.
Some past writers have claimed most nineteenth century territorial
judges were hacks or worse. Hall does not buy this line. But these
men were clearly a cut below district judges in morality and abil-
ity. We read, for example, about William W. Drummond, ap-
pointed to the bench in Utah by Franklin Pierce, who set off for his
post with a prostitute from the District of Columbia, passing her
off as his sister.n This was, of course, an extreme case. But the
quality of the territorial bench is not something Hall leaves to con-
jecture. He tries to measure and compare systematically the back-
grounds of the two groups of judges. It turns out the two were
"similar in social origins and academic and legal educations."' 3
But nominees for territorial courts were less prestigious, less well
known. Some had "no legal reputation or were known only in the
immediate communities they served."'" Less than a third had ever
presided over a court, while more than half of the district judges
had judicial experience.' They were also significantly younger than
district court nominees. These differences, as Hall points out, are
easy to explain. The territories were far off. The pay was poor; the
work conditions bad. Such a job attracted young, unknown law-
yers, anxious to start their way up the ladder of success. A district
court judgeship, on the other hand, crowned or rounded off a ca-
reer. It was less likely to be filled with carpetbaggers. So, although
22. K. HAu, supra note 1, at 120. In office, he lived up (or down) to expectations. He
was prejudiced, incompetent, and often left his post to look after business affairs in Califor-
nia. After he and his slave were involved in an assault on a horse trader, Drummond was
indicted for attempted murder by a Mormon grand jury. Later he fled the territory and
resigned before Buchanan could remove him. Id. at 134-35.
23. Id. at 157.
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id. at 160-61.
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there were real differences between the two sets of judges, the dif-
ferences did not touch the process of selection.
Does the process explain anything? This remains unknown. Is
there some facet in the behavior of judges which we can reliably
attribute to tenure differences (election vs. appointment) or to dif-
ferences in political or social background? Hall makes no attempt
to answer this question. Perhaps he would be foolish to try. There
is no easy or obvious way to measure performance in office. For
anyone minded to make the study, Hall has given us data on the
social class background of his group of judges. What he finds is
interesting, although not unexpected. Most nominees came from
"either elite or prominent social origins. '2 1 Only twenty-four per-
cent came from "modest" backgrounds. This was true of men
nominated by Whigs and Democrats alike despite the "rhetorical
commitment" of the Democrats to the common man.? As ex-
pected, moreover, judges were far more educated than the common
man; no surprises here. Most Americans of the age were farmers,
plain and simple; the judges were lawyers, and lawyers who stuck
out even from the crowd of lawyers in some way, even if that way
was the fact of blood relation to a congressman.
After presenting his data on background, Hall describes his
judges as "neither a traditional functional elite that served out of
a sense of social responsibility" (whatever that might mean) nor a
"modern technical elite that commanded selection as a conse-
quence of judicial experience and professional prestige. 28 This is
certainly true. It is still true. The process he describes, and the men
he describes, are simply not captured in either of the two quoted
phrases. In a word, they were politicians. Their party background
was and is all-important. Hall's book begins with Andrew Jackson.
If he implies that Jackson represented some kind of break with the
past, I suspect he is wrong. Nonetheless, it is true that "[t]he
judicial selection process confirmed the legitimacy in the political
culture of party activism. '2 9 That, it seems to me, is the major
point, and one worth stressing. Method of selection, in the formal
sense, seems secondary. What is and has been crucial, for at least
180 years, is that judgeship in the United States is a reward for
26. Id. at 153.
27. Id. at 153-55. Hall, in one of the few places that deals explicitly with earlier peri-
ods, shows that the percentage of nominees with "modest" origins increased about 10% dur-
ing the period covered, compared to prior periods. This means an increase from about 14% to
24%. The numbers are small, and the data rough. I doubt very much whether this difference
is significant, statistically or otherwise.




service to party. Judges are party men, doers, pragmatics; in other
words, people who dirty their hands in the give and take of politics
at some point in their careers. The territorial bench was, as Hall
describes it, a place for young men on the make. No doubt most of
them never expected to spend a lifetime as territorial judges. Dis-
trict court judgeships were more the place for extinct volcanoes.
What tied them together was politics, in the most basic, funda-
mental sense.
The natural question to ask is whether all this is good or bad
for the bench, the law, or the country. There are systems where
judgeship really is "bureaucratic." Judges in civil law countries, on
the whole, really are civil servants; they really are out of partisan
politics, in the crude sense in which American judges are in parti-
san politics. In civil law countries the judge's image is that of "the
operator of a machine designed and built by legislatures,"3 a kind
of "expert clerk."'" Of course, these judges are political too, in a
subtle and insidious sense. The question, although highly interest-
ing, is, I believe, ultimately meaningless. In my view, a dessicated,
bureaucratic, "'modern" judiciary would be a disaster in the United
States, and it is absurd to think of exporting the American style of
judging to France. In any case, no such exchange will ever take
place. There is an intimate connection between law and society,
between styles of judging and society. We have activist courts in
the United States; courts that for better or for worse (in my view,
for the better) work at the cutting edge of policy. Alexis de Toc-
queville noticed this in the nineteenth century, 2 and the process
has accelerated over the years. If courts have to decide (as our fed-
eral courts do) issues of environmental policy, issues of constitu-
tional right, issues that cut as close to the bone as abortion, race
relations, prisoners' rights, and Indian land claims, they had better
be politically aware and had better be attuned to social needs and
social consequences. "Law" is not enough, and all insiders (cer-
tainly all judges) know this. The process of decision is not "mod-
em" in the sense Hall uses this word. It never was, in key cases.
This dirty little secret has been out for decades; we did not need a
book like The Brethren33 to tell it. Arguably, it is the glory, not the
shame, of our court system. At their best, our courts are sensitive
to human values, capable of give and take, and open to social and
political fact.
30. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVL LAW TRADITIoN 38 (1969).
31. Id. at 37.
32. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98-103 (1951).
33. See generally R. WooDwARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRErREN (1979).
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We have activist courts, and an intensely political way of
choosing judges. These two aspects of American law are certainly
not unrelated. They fit each other like hand and glove. Through a
long, intricate historical dance of fate, they have become totally
intertwined, and are now inseparable. How this came about and
grew is an important part of our history, and The Politics of Justice
makes a definite contribution to the telling.
MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TwICE?, By Charles E. McLure,
Jr. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979. Pp. xvii,
262. $11.95 cloth; $4.95 paper.
Reviewed by Allaire Urban Karzon*
This study by Charles E. McLure, Jr.1 originated from a 1977
conference at the Brookings Institution,' which focused on the tech-
nical and administrative problems that would be encountered if
this country were to integrate in any form the corporate and indi-
vidual income taxes. Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? is a
feasibility study of integration in practice, not a policy evaluation
of the social desirability of integration.
McLure first recommends the introduction of standard ter-
minology to eliminate some of the confusion that clouds this area. He
notes that "integration" means different things to different people
and that the phrase "partial integration" is misleading.3 His point is
more than a matter of semantics and warrants elaboration. Under
our present classical system, income earned by a corporation is taxed
to the corporation and, when distributed in the form of dividends, is
taxed as ordinary income at the stockholders' marginal rates. Under
McLure's definition of full "integration," the corporation is treated
as a nontaxpaying conduit (like a partnership), and all corporate
income is currently taxed to the stockholders whether or not the
income is in fact retained by the corporation or distributed.4 As to
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., Wellesley College, 1945;
J.D., Yale University, 1947. The reviewer wishes to thank Samuel E. Long, Jr. for his assis-
tance in the preparation of this Review.
1. McLure, currently Vice President of the National Bureau of Economic Research, is
Allyn R. and Gladys M. Cline Professor of Economics and Finance at Rice University.
2. The forty participants included several of the most prominent scholars of federal tax
law, such as Stanley S. Surrey of Harvard Law School and Alvin C. Warren, Jr., of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
3. C. McLuRE, MUST CouRPoRATE INcoME BE TAXED TWiCE? 4-5, 14 (1979).
4. Id. at 2-3.
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those systems of reform that only reduce the double taxation of
income if that income is distributed as dividends, which others call
"partial integration," McLure suggests the term "dividend relief,"' 5 a
term he uses with no pejorative connotation.'
Dividend relief takes the form of the credit method or the divi-
dend deduction method.7 Under the former, the stockholder re-
ceives a credit against his tax for all (or a part) of the income tax
paid by the corporation on the earnings from which the dividends
are deemed paid. The stockholder reports on his return the actual
dividend plus ("grossed-up" by) the amount of the corporate tax
Which he receives as a tax credit.' Under the dividend deduction
method, the corporation takes a deduction for all (or a part) of the
dividends paid, similar to the deduction for interest, and the stock-
holder is fully taxable on the dividend. Dividend relief also in-
cludes, according to McLure's definition, the "split-rate" method9
by which earnings distributed as dividends are still taxed to the
corporation but at a lower rate than retained earnings."°
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 5 n.8, 215 n.1.
7. Id. at 2-3.
8. The "gross-up" mechanism is similar to that employed in the computation of the
indirect foreign tax credit for dividends received by eligible domestic corporations from cer-
tain foreign corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 78, 902(a).
9. C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 3.
10. The contrasting operation of the personal and corporate tax systems can be illus-
trated as follows (leaving aside the $100 exclusion for dividend income under § 116 of the
Internal Revenue Code). Assume a corporation with all of its income taxable at a 50% rate,
with only one stockholder, taxable income of $1,000, tax liability of $500 and a dividend paid
of $100. Under our present classical system, the stockholder would pay a tax on his $100
dividend depending on his marginal bracket-his tax liability could be as low as zero or as
high as $70. The amount of the corporate tax is separate and has no effect on the stock-
holder's personal tax.
Under full integration, the $500 tax paid by the corporation would be considered as
equivalent to a withholding tax paid on behalf of the stockholder. The stockholder would be
currently taxed on his personal return on the entire $1,000 of corporate income (although he
actually received only $100), would receive credit against his personal tax liability for the
$500 of tax paid by the corporation, and would have the basis of his shares increased by $400
(the amount of corporate earnings retained by the corporation in excess of the $500 tax and
$100 dividend).
Under the stockholder credit form of dividend relief, assuming a system granting the
stockholder full credit, the shareholder receiving the $100 dividend out of the $500 after-tax
corporate income would be deemed to have paid one-fifth of the corporate tax. The stock-
holder thus would report a total of $200 on his personal return (the actual dividend of $100
grossed-up by the full corporate tax credit of $100) and would have a tax credit of $100
against his personal tax liability. With a full credit, the dividend would thus cause the
stockholder to pay additional personal taxes only to the extent that his top marginal bracket
exceeded the corporate marginal bracket of 50%.
Under the dividend-paid deduction method of dividend relief, assuming a full deduc-
tion, the corporation's taxable income would be $900 ($1,000 minus the $100 dividend) and
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McLure's suggestions for clarification of terminology are ap-
propriate. The term "partial integration" may be misleading" by
implying that it is part of a continuous spectrum with full integra-
tion. In fact, while the objectives and consequences of full integra-
tion and "partial integration" may overlap, they are far from iden-
tical, and the advocates of one system are often antagonistic to the
other.'2 McLure's further comment, that his term "dividend relief'
has no pejorative connotation, is welcome. It adds a tone of neu-
trality to a field scarred by controversy and enables him to cover
both concepts in a factual, detached manner."3
Although his purpose is not to re-debate the policy aspects of
the two systems of tax reform, McLure includes an excellent chap-
ter summarizing the basic philosophical arguments for and against
each method in order to compare the administrative problems in-
herent in implementing each. While the author admits that he has
been an "advocate of full integration and, with less enthusiasm, of
dividend relief,"' 4 he nevertheless describes the views of the sup-
porters and opponents of each method with meticulous even-
handed objectivity.
The theoretical premise on which the case for integration rests
(which has been expounded most impressively by McLure himself
in his earlier writings) 5 is that a corporation is simply the aggre-
gate of its owners, has no taxpaying ability independent of its
the stockholder would have $100 of income. A variant of this method is the "split rate"
system in which the corporation is allowed to deduct only a portion of the dividends paid.
Thus, if the corporation could deduct only 50% of dividends paid, this would result in a
lower tax rate of 25% on the corporation for income paid out as dividends and a higher tax
rate of 50% on income the corporation retained.
For tables comparing the classical system, the fully integrated system, and the credit
system with varying degrees of gross-up, see C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 6, 16.
11. McLure refers to instances of "partial partial" integration or "partial total" inte-
gration. Id. at 4. See also Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 461, 463 n.12 (1978) (reference to "complete partial integration" (as op-
posed to "partial partial integration")).
12. McLure observes that Professor Surrey has made the same substantive point (al-
though Surrey is among those who use "partial integration" to refer to dividend relief). C.
McLURE, supra note 3, at 30. Thus Professor Surrey states that "integration... is a slippery
word" because the economists use it in terms of "full integration," while "the business
groups pushing integration are talking in terms of 'partial integration,' which in simple
terms means tax relief for dividends. Each is thus seeking a different goal." Surrey, Reflec-
tions on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 335, 335
(1975).
13. C. McLURE, supra note 3, at 19 n.1.
14. Id.
15. See McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARv. L. REv. 532 (1975); McLure, Integration
of the Income Taxes: Why and How, 2 J. CoRP. TAX. 429 (1976).
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shareholders, and exists only as a conduit. If the conduit nature of
the corporation is accepted as a first premise, then the present
unintegrated tax system is seen as grossly inequitable, conflicting
with the "vertical equity and ability-to-pay principles of taxa-
tion." According to this view, distributed corporate income is
taxed more heavily than ordinary income, retained undistributed
corporate income is taxed inadequately, and the "overtaxation" of
dividends falls most heavily on low-bracket taxpayers and most
lightly on high-bracket taxpayers." Integrationists complete their
attack on the present system by alleging that it also produces inef-
ficiencies and distortions in the economy, including misallocation
of resources between the corporate and noncorporate sectors, a
preference for debt financing over equity, and a negative effect on
capital formation. 8
With remarkable detachment, the chapter then presents the
two major charges made by the foes of integration, led by Professor
Stanley Surrey." First, Surrey, backed by his school of econo-
mists,20 asserts that McLure's perception of the corporation as a
conduit belongs in the realm of "tax theology" and that it is
equally sound, as a first premise, to treat the corporation as a sepa-
rate entity. Surrey states:
I do not propose to pursue this tax theology further, since it suffices to
indicate there are two tax theological doctrines and a legislator need not
feel obligated to consider himself a tax sinner if he resists any drive for
integration. He will have respectable tax theological support for his
attitude.2 '
Apart from his theoretical dispute with the integrationists over
their first premise, Surrey dismisses "the economists' dream" of
full integration as "only a dream"22 that will not work.23 He charges
16. McLure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing
Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. Rav. 532, 535 (1975).
17. See id. at 535-536, 539.
18. C. McLuPE, supra note 3, at 22-27. See also McLure, supra note 16, at 540-42.
Economists other than McLure have also expressed these concerns. See G. BREAK & J.
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 92-95 (1975).
19. C. McLUraE, supra note 3, at 28-38. For a summary of Surrey's views, see Surrey,
supra note 12. Surrey personally identifies McLure with the concept of the corporation as a
conduit. Id. at 335.
20. Surrey claims the support of economists such as Richard B. Goode. Surrey, supra
note 12, at 335 n.2. See R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INcoME TAX (1951).
21. Surrey, supra note 12, at 335.
22. Surrey repeatedly chides the economists for their "dream" of integration. Id. at
335, 337-38.
23. Surrey emphasizes the cash squeeze that would face stockholders if they were
taxed currently on undistributed corporate earnings, commenting that the economists' only
solution is to make the top corporate and individual rates similar. Either rate similarity
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further that economists are endangering tax reform, because they
"are being used"24 by business interests to make integration sound
respectable. Once before Congress, Surrey warns, there will be a
"fast shuffie" by these business interests, who will then switch
from endorsement of full integration to support for "partial integra-
tion" (McLure's "dividend relief"). Here Surrey disagrees sharply
with McLure. For while McLure throughout the book presents an
open mind about dividend relief as an acceptable alternative to full
integration 6 and methodically examines each topic from the stand-
point of both full integration and dividend relief, Surrey decries all
forms of dividend relief as a "revenue bonanza" to upper-bracket
shareholders which if enacted would mean "a real decline in tax
fairness."-" Surrey, therefore, admonishes the economists to drop
their talk of integration lest in the name of equity they do a real
disservice to the cause of equity by facilitating the passage of divi-
dend relief.
Against this background, McLure addresses the operational
difficulties that would confront efforts to introduce full integration
into our existing tax structure. He explores, among other matters,
the enormous data processing and timing problems every corpora-
tion would encounter in reporting, sufficiently soon after the close
of the corporate year, the prorata share of the company's annual
earnings that each person owning its stock during any part of the
year would be required to include in his current return;2' the re-
quirement that each individual stockholder would be responsible
for adjusting each year the basis, for capital gain and loss purposes,
of each share he owned to reflect the proper portion of each corpo-
means raising the corporate rates to 70%-which, he notes, would deplete corporate capital
by leaving management with only 30% of profits for reinvestment-or rate similarity means
lowering the top individual marginal rate to the corporate level (then 48%). The latter alter-
native, according to Surrey, would produce a severe consequent loss of revenue which would
be offset, according to some economists, by tax reforms such as taxing all capital gains cur-
rently as ordinary income. Surrey expresses his skepticism that as to either proposal busi-
ness or Congress would follow the economists as "Pied Pipers." Id. at 336-38.
24. Id. at 335.
25. Id.
26. E.g., C. McLURE, supra note 3, at 5 n.8, 43, 215 n.1.
27. Surrey, supra note 12, at 339.
28. Id. It is interesting that McLure and Surrey are in accord on one point. Each be-
lieves that the result of Congressional consideration of integration is so unpredictable that it
is questionable whether any of the interested parties, be they business groups or tax reform-
er, may "want to push integration into the legislative arena and risk the roll of the legisla-
tive dice." See McLure & Surrey, Integration of Income Taxes: Issues for Debate, 55 HARV.
Bus. &av. 169, 181 (Sept.-Oct. 1977).
29. C. McLuRa, supra note 3, at 156, 216.
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ration's undistributed earnings taxed to him;M the difficulty of allo-
cating corporate income and tax preferences on a timely basis
among various classes of stock;"' the "hopelessly complicated" situ-
ation that would occur if thousands of individual stockholders that
currently report their share of corporate income on their returns
were required to reopen those returns in later years as a result of
subsequent audit adjustments or amended returns of the corpora-
tion;" the "impossible" situation that could arise if after lengthy
tax litigation adjustments should occur in corporate income that
would involve commensurate adjustments to the basis of shares
sold by the stockholders during the interval consumed by the liti-
gation;33 the inability to determine a satisfactory date for the allo-
cation of corporate losses to stockholders;" the "unacceptable bur-
den" that would be placed on millions of stockholders if the benefit
of preferences, such as the investment tax credit and foreign tax
credit, were passed through to them individually and each stock-
holder was then required to calculate his own investment and for-
eign tax credits based on information supplied by the corporation
but with statutory limitations imposed by law at the stockholder
level;3 and, finally, the cash squeeze that could occur for stock-
holders in marginal rate brackets (potentially as high as seventy
percent) exceeding the top corporate rate (presently forty-six per-.
cent) if they were taxed currently on income in fact retained for
reinvestment by the corporation." McLure thus concedes: "In
short, the pure partnership method [full integration] would be diffi-
cult to administer if it suffered from only one of the problems out-
lined above. Since it could be afflicted with all of them, it does not
seem to be a viable alternative.""
One might wish that the author's treatment of this subject had
ended with this unequivocal conclusion. The clarity of his conclu-
sion on the infeasibility of integration, however, is somewhat ob-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 216. Goode has concluded that big corporations with large numbers of stock-
holders and complex capital structures could not be included in a full integration system. R.
GooDE, POSTWAR CORPORATION TAX STRucTuRE 20-21 (1948). McLure aptly replied that, if
large firms with complicated capital structures were excluded, it would "make integration a
shell not worth the effort." See C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 157.
32. C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 157, 216.
33. Id. at 158.
34. Id. at 156, 216. The author and the conference participants noted that daily alloca-
tion of losses would not be administratively feasible, but allocation of losses to stockholders
of record on the last day of the year would invite "trafficking" in losses. Id. at 216.
35. Id. at 159, 217.
36. Id. at 217.
37. Id. at 159.
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scured by the structure of the book, which ends with a chapter
summarizing the 1977 Brookings conference in the format of a long
series of conflicting questions38 raised by the participants and re-
flecting what McLure calls their "disquieting lack of agreement."'39
The reader is left somewhat perplexed since many of the questions
on integration in that last chapter are a reiteration of issues previ-
ously raised and presumably disposed of in earlier chapters, with
some finality, by the author. The definiteness of his conclusion that
integration will not work is further clouded by a later statement
that full integration "should not simply be dismissed as an acade-
mician's pipe dream" and by his call for "further analysis" and
"more analysis" of this system." Such statements, it is submitted,
are unsubstantiated, because all of the solid documentation he has
amassed in his study confirms his first conclusion. 1 His few depar-
tures on this one point from his customary objectivity are forgive-
able, perhaps, if one realizes that even with academicians old loy-
alties, as well as old dogmas, can be expected to die hard.
Apart from the topic of integration and its feasibility, a some-
what separate theme, backed by good material, gradually evolves
and grows in importance in McLure's study and consequently de-
serves attention. In reviewing the status of integration, McLure
was led to re-examine the experience of France, the United King-
dom, West Germany, and Canada, all of which have recently re-
vised their corporation-shareholder systems of taxation, adopting
the shareholder credit form of dividend relief. In so doing, he notes,
these foreign governments either disassociated their new systems
from, or explictly rejected, the integrationists' concept of the corpo-
ration as a conduit. Thus, in enacting its law, the West German
government stated:
The government does not subscribe to the controversial view of public
finance experts that the separate taxation of legal entities is unjustified.
On the contrary, the government rejects this view. Within the frame-
work of constitutional limitations, the political decision as to the extent
to which the double tax of legal entities and their shareholders should
be maintained, reduced or eliminated is strictly one of expediency.'2
38. Id. at 215-49.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 15, 166.
41. See id. at 146-66. He also notes that no country in the world has full integration.
Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 44. See also Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experi-
ence, 31 TAX LAw. 65 (1977). Gourevitch comments: "In this statement, the [West German]
government came down on the side of the separate entity theory of corporate taxation, ac-
cording to which a corporation is a taxpaying entity on its own entirely separate from its
shareholders." Id. at 70.
1032 [Vol. 33:1026
BOOK REVIEWS
Similarly, when Canada, France, and the United Kingdom revised
their tax laws no reservations were expressed about "the separate
economic reality of corporate entities." 3 The inference is clear from
the European experience that the shareholder credit method is fea-
sible and viable apart from the theory of integration to which it has
been attached apparently by United States authors only.
McLure's examination of the operation of the European and
Canadian systems is relevant for an understanding of these intri-
cate foreign systems, in and of themselves, and for guidance in an-
swering the question whether any of their features could be suc-
cessfully transplanted to the United States. His numerous tables
illustrate how the four systems work in various hypothetical model
situations, the differing objectives each country sought to attain
with its new tax approach, and the policy compromises each was
forced to accept." He describes 5 the pragmatic rather than puristic
origins of the several systems. Each country was prompted to re-
duce the tax drain on dividends in order to make the after-tax re-
turn on equities more attractive for national fiscal and political
reasons. Thus, the French sought to strengthen the French stock
market as a means of raising equity capital. West Germany's in-
tent in adopting its first version of dividend relief was to stimulate
its depressed stock market when the Allied occupation ended fol-
lowing World War II. Canada was bent on encouraging equity in-
vestments by Canadians in Canadian firms rather than in foreign
enterprises."
McLure's survey of foreign practices leads him to observe that
the implementation of a shareholder credit system in the United
States, even without the handicaps of full integration, would face
difficult threshold policy and administrative questions. What
should the relationship be between the basic corporate income tax
rate and the top marginal individual rate? Should all or only a por-
tion of the corporate tax on the earnings distributed as dividends
43. Canada has rejected a specific proposal for full integration in adopting its share-
holder credit system. Gourevitch, supra note 42, at 86. For a discussion of France and the
United Kingdom, see C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 45.
44. C. McLuIE, supra note 3, at 50-91. One table also adds to this group, for compara-
tive purposes, the key features of the tax systems of the United States, the Netherlands, and
Japan. Id. at 74-75.
45. See id. at 76.
46. For more details on the original objectives of the European countries in enacting
the shareholder credit system, see Gourevitch, supra note 42, at 67-75; Hammer, The Taxa-
tion of Income from Corporate Shareholders: Review of Present Systems in Canada, France,
Germany, Japan and the U.K., 28 NAT'L TAX J. 315 (1975); Norr, The French Reform of
Dividend Taxation and Common Market Tax Harmonization, 44 TAXES 320 (1966).
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be offset by the shareholder credit?" Should the credit be fixed or
variable?" Should excess credits be refundable to stockholders?
Should the credits be available to tax-exempt charitable and edu-
cational institutions and to tax-exempt pension and profit-sharing
trusts?49 Should the credit be available to foreign investors (either
portfolio owners or corporations owning United States subsidiar-
ies)? McLure examines how each of these issues has been handled
by the three model European countries and the precedent that they
may have established for us. His analysis points up the fact that
various objectives, such as tax fairness for individuals, tax neutral-
ity in the treatment of income flowing across international bounda-
ries, economic principles of national and international efficiency,
minimization of revenue loss to the country in which the dividends
originate, and feasibility of administration,0 are competing and in-
compatible. Even the Europeans with their headstart on imple-
menting a shareholder credit system have not devised a solution to
encompass all of these objectives satisfactorily. One example, out
of many McLure discusses, can illustrate the dilemma. If foreign
stockholders are not permitted the benefit of the credit, this will
contribute to achieving the objective of minimization of revenue
loss. But denial of the credit to foreign stockholders can discourage
foreign investment both inward and outward, violate treaty obliga-
tions, and contravene commitments to foster international trade."
McLure's discussion of the European experience thus under-
47. For a discussion of how the French and United Kingdom systems have dealt with
this question, see Hammer, supra note 46. For a discussion of the new German system, as
well as the 1975 proposal for a uniform shareholder credit method within the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), see Ault, supra note 11, at 466-71, 477-83.
48. The Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association in reviewing this entire
area concluded that a credit system under which the rate would fluctuate annually and by
corporation "would involve complexity. . . which is entirely unnecessary." CoMMITTE ON
CORPORATIONS OF THE TAX SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE
INTEGRATION OF CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INcoME TAXFs, reprinted in 31 TAX 1.Aw. 37, 44-45
(1977) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK BAR REPORT]. It recommended a fixed credit if this
system were adopted. Id. at 44-45, 63.
The latest United States proposal for partial dividend relief, involving a shareholder
credit system, was introduced by Chairman Al Ullman of the House Committee on Ways
and Means in 1978. The Ullman proposal involved a mechanism to limit the amount of
credit allowed shareholders to the amount of taxes actually paid by the corporation. See 124
CONG. REc. H640-42, H2337-39 (daily ed. Feb. 2, Mar. 22, 1978). McLure briefly discusses
the Ullman proposal, see C. McLURE, supra note 3, at 143-45, although McLure's study was
essentially completed before the proposal became public. Id. at 1 n.1.
49. C. McLuRE, supra note 3, at 77.
50. Id. at 204-14.
51. For a discussion of European solutions of this problem, see Goureviteh, supra note
42, at 89-95, 104-07. See also Ault, supra note 11, at 470-71 (German treaty policy on foreign
shareholders), 473-74 (French treaty policy on foreign shareholders), 476-77 (United King-
dom treaty policy on foreign shareholders).
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lines the fact that a morass of unsettled problems still plagues the
shareholder credit system, with some of the most complicated re-
lating to international consequences. Because of the growth of mul-
tinational corporations, both in the United States and abroad, and
the extent to which transnational businesses and investment have
permeated the economies of the developed countries, no major revi-
sion in the taxation of corporations or stockholders can fail to have
significant international ramifications. Yet prior studies, he notes,
have tended to overlook the international factor inherent in such
domestic reform.2 McLure's review of the major questions that re-
main unanswered relating to the shareholder credit method, espe-
cially in the international context, leads to the inescapable infer-
ence that its adoption at this time would be premature. 3 There are
too many pitfalls that an uninformed, precipitous legislative move
could unwittingly create.
Before closing, some minor flaws in the book must be men-
tioned. Parts of its analysis are needlessly repetitive. McLure's
style is not crisp. There is not sufficient recognition of the criti-
cism, expressed mainly by the legal profession, that the proposed
tax reforms discussed by McLure would introduce great and per-
haps unjustified complexity to the Internal Revenue Code.5 ' To
some, reforms that are comprehensible only to technicians are not
reforms. To some, simplification of the tax laws and certainty of
consequences for taxpayers are objectives greatly to be desired. 5
52. C. McLURE, supra note 3, at 185. While United States tax experts generally have
tended to ignore the international consequences of corporate-shareholder tax reform, McLure
notes that the Europeans have been more aware of it. Id. at 87. He suggests that we might
profit from more analysis of their experience. Id. at 50. See also Ault, supra note 11, at 461-
62.
53. There has been a curious lack of in-depth studies of the operation of the European
shareholder credit system. The New York State Bar Association analysis of the 1977 Trea-
sury proposal for integration or dividend relief noted that there was no empirical evidence
cited by the Treasury Department on the effectiveness of the shareholder credit system in
the countries where it has been in operation. See NEW YORK BAR REPORT, supra note 48, at
39 n.13, 63 n.79. Gourevitch, in noting the lack of hard data, questions whether it is possible
to measure the objectives of the European systems against results because of the constant
presence of nontax economic and fiscal factors. See Gourevitch, supra note 42, at 77-78.
Another commentator found no clear cut evidence that the shareholder credit system has
been a fiscal stimulant. See Severiens, Does a Dividend Tax Credit Work?, 54 TAxEs 17, 20-
26 (1976). Neither of these articles examined the topic with the scholarly, methodical, and
statistical approach that is McLure's special technique.
54. See NEw YORK BAR REPORT, supra note 48, at 46-47, 63.
55. It has been said: "The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxa-
tion, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it ap-
pears, I believe from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small
degree of uncertainty." E. GRIswoLD & M. GRAE'rz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 33 (1976)
(quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAusEs OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
371 (1872)).
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But such objectives do not seem to be accorded adequate weight in
McLure's scales when balanced against the grand doctrines of tax
equity.
Such minor criticism, however, cannot be allowed to detract
from the substance of the book. McLure's study may well come to
be regarded as a pioneering integrationist's definitive statement
that marked the end of an era in which integration was explored as
a realistic legislative route. Others may view the study as marking
the emergence of an international consciousness long overdue
among classical tax academicians. McLure's material, if not per-
suasive, at least seriously raises the proposition that any recom-
mendations to modify our current system of taxation of corpora-
tions and shareholders can no longer be judged solely within the
confines of a closed domestic economy, but must also be scruti-
nized for their inherent international tax repercussions. Whatever
theme in the book ultimately prevails as having the greatest signif-
icance, McLure has produced a fundamental work.
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